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1. The decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) on the European Central
Bank’s PSPP program did not come as a shock. All the critical arguments of that
decision can be found explicitly or implicitly in the BVerfG’s referral to the Court of
Justice of the EU on 18 July 2017. The CJEU replied through the preliminary ruling
of 11 December 2018 (Weiss and Others, C-493/17).
2. The real object of the decision of the BVerfG is the economic governance of the
Eurozone or rather the big bet of European solidarity and European integration,
in the midst of a pandemic even. These are all of particular interest to Greece,
which has acted as a lever of pressure and as a laboratory to test new institutions of
economic governance and even quantitative easing.
3. The reasoning of the BVerfG tries to make itself appear as simple. The principle
of proportionality (points 124-157), together with the principle of subsidiarity, is,
in accordance with Article 5 TEU, the criterion for determining the competences
of the Member States and the Union. Therefore, the competences of the Union,
its institutions and bodies must not be exercised unless it is appropriate and
necessary. When the limit of the principle of proportionality is not respected, EU
competence shall be exercised in excess of power, ultra vires. Ultra vires control
shall be exercised on the basis of the principle of conferred (from Member States
to the EU) competences (point 158), explicitly provided for in Article 5 TEU, which
introduces (according to the BVerfG logic) a presumption of competence in favour
of the Member States. This control ensures – according to this logic – the equality
among Member States and the respect towards their national identity which is in line
with their fundamental political and constitutional structure, as provided for in Article
4 TEU.
4. Who has contributed in this case to excess of power, according to the logic
of BVerfG? The BVerfG holds that this is double ultra vires, through actions and
through omissions. The ECB is operating ultra vires due to its initiatives in the field of
monetary policy that enter into the field of economic policy. The CJEU does because
it is satisfied with a marginal judicial review of these actions in a methodologically
lacking way.
5. The irony is that, in the name of equality among Member States, a blow is
inflicted to the institutional equality between the Member States. The exceeding of
the competence of the EU is ascertained by one of the 27 national constitutional
or supreme courts, while the rest may have a completely different view. In fact,
the question if we are outside the scope of the legal order of the EU can, as a
question of international law, only be resolved by all the High Contracting Parties
in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties (VCLT), not
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unilaterally. After all, the Member State in question is not represented internationally
by its national constitutional court, but by the bodies of its executive.
6. Perhaps for this reason the BVerfG interlaces ultra vires control with the control
of respect for the national constitutional identity (points 98-105), in accordance with
the provision and therefore in application of Article 4 TEU. However, in my opinion,
the national constitutional identity should refer to a specific institutional feature.
The distinction between the monetary policy pursued by the ECB/ESCB and the
economic policy pursued by the Member States applies equally to all EU Member
States and is not a specific element of the German constitutional order. Accepting
the view that there are differences in sensitivities among Member States in matters
of democratic principle, popular sovereignty, parliamentary competences over state
budgets would be risky and precarious for the democratic and legal foundations of
the EU and for the equality of Member States. All these are common elements and
not a German constitutional feature, such as e.g. the constitutional regulation of the
relationship between the State and religious entities or the constitutional protection of
the limitation period as an institution of substantive criminal law.
7. There is also a second issue of general theory of constitutional law and
fundamental principles of EU law stemming from the judgement of the German
Constitutional Court: According to the BVerfG (in particular point 142), in the
common European constitutional and judicial tradition, the judicial review of acts
of independent authorities in the field of monetary policy must be exercised in
all its depth and breadth by the competent court which, in the frame of the EU
institutional system, is the CJEU. According to the BVerfG, this is a constitutional
tradition, common among Member States and therefore a fundamental principle
of EU law (Article 6 (3) TEU), especially when the competent body, e.g. the ECB,
is independent and lacks democratic legitimacy. If the judicial control exercised by
the CJEU is marginal, i.e. exercised only in case of an obvious breach of EU law,
this, according to the BVerfG, violates a general principle of EU law resulting from
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, i.e. that the national
courts exercise intensive judicial control of the actions of independent bodies such
as central banks.
Thus, the BVerfG turns judicial activism in complex technical monetary policy issues
into a general principle of European law which it derives from common constitutional
traditions. But if there is a common tradition, it is judicial self-restraint in the control
of technical assessments, including monetary policy decisions, where this is still
practised at national level. According to the BVerfG, when the CJEU does not apply
the methodological conception of the German Constitutional Court, it does not act as
an institution of the EU, so it moves ultra vires. That is why the CJEU decision in the
Weiss case is denounced as incomprehensible and irrational.
8. All this, of course, begins with the fact that we have a Monetary Union without
an Economic Union. This creates a perpetual friction with regard to the allocation
of powers, because monetary policy – a key instrument of economic policy – is
exercised by the ECB, while economic policy – without the instrument of monetary
policy, but using the remaining instruments (such as fiscal policy) – is exercised
by the Member States which also claim their remaining sovereignty. The monetary
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policy is being implemented at Union level, in spite of the great economic and
budgetary disparities between the Member States of the Eurozone.
9. Which gets us to the point: Can economic policy be clearly distinguished from
monetary policy? The path taken by CJEU case law between the Pringle and
the Weiss Decision essentially shows that this is largely impossible. There is no
monetary policy that does not have economic implications and vice versa. There is
an obvious centre of gravity, though. On the contrary, according to the BVerfG (cf.
in particular point 139), incidental economic implications of monetary policy are one
thing. Having monetary policy (as is the case with the PSPP) set central economic
policy objectives with implications relating to a chain of issues is another, such as
interest rates, stock values, real estate values, bank deposit interest yields, the
stability of commercial banks, the stability of central banks, the financing conditions
of the Member States, the ability of financing non-viable enterprises at low interest
rates.
In my view, the main axis of thought of the BVerfG in the decision of 05 May 2020 is
the following: In 2012, in the Pringle case, the CJEU ruled that the field of operation
was that of economic policy, in 2015 in the Gauweiler I case that it was that of
monetary policy, and now the BVerfG is offering its own ruling concerning the field:
The principle of proportionality requires the ECB to provide a precise and detailed
explanation of what constitutes economic policy and what constitutes monetary
policy, as well as why the burden of its acts on quantitative easing falls within the
boundaries of monetary policy and therefore it has competence over it. The ECB is
obliged, according to the BVerfG, to delimitate monetary policy interventions if they
impact economic policy decisively and on a wide scale. According to the BVerfG,
the program of quantitative easing, at its start in 2015, may not have caused any
issues, but after three, four, five years, when it has exceeded 2 trillion EUR and it
is on the way to reach 2.5 trillion, it will have affected all aspects of the economy. It
does not just seek to achieve an inflation rate below 2%, but close to that, in line with
the ECB’s basic institutional purpose. It affects the entirety of economic policy.
10. The ECB does nothing more than what all central banks of major economies
that are competitive to the EU, like the US Federal Bank, do. Unfortunately, the
European Union has imposed on itself irrational institutional arrangements leading to
misinterpretations such as the decision of the BVerfG.
11.  The BVerfG calls on the Federal Government and the Federal Parliament
(cf. in particular point 232) to act politically and legally in order for the ECB/ESCB
to comply with the decision. Additionally (points 234-235), the Bundesbank must
wait three months for the additional documentation of the PSPP’s proportionality
on part of the ECB/ECSC, but as of now it must arrange an exit strategy from the
quantitative easing program in cooperation with the ECB. All this takes place on 05
May 2020, when it is known that the “pandemic” quantitative easing program PEPP
is beginning.
12. After all, who will judge whether or not the ECB/ESCB has within the transitional
period of three months complied with the requirements for additional documentation
and justification based on the criteria of the principle of proportionality? The Federal
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Government and the Federal Parliament? The Bundesbank? The CJEU? The
BVerfG itself through a new constitutional appeal? A new constitutional appeal will
probably be lodged against the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP).
13. What has happened is a new Deauville. On 18 October 2010, as soon as the first
Greek support program was launched, President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel,
on the sidelines of a meeting with President Yeltsin in Deauville, made the infamous
statement that Eurozone countries should not borrow at the same interest rates.
Each country has to borrow on the basis of its fundamental economic elements and
its own risk. Germany cannot have the same interest rates and returns as Greece.
And thus they destroyed the first Greek bailout program.
We may be in danger of a repeat of this situation now. What the BVerfG is
essentially saying is that it does not make sense to facilitate the refinancing of
Member States’ debt. This is an artificial valuation of their bonds on the secondary
market of QE. In fact, the same can be done for commercial companies that receive
low interest rates while being “zombies”. According to the BVerfG, the major risk is
the banking system. In order for the QE mechanism to work, states issue bonds.
The commercial banks of the Member States buy the bonds (primary market). The
commercial banks of the Member States resell them to the central bank system.
The central banks buy them. Thus, the BVerfG says that the central banks are now
exposed to this market volume of 2.5 trillion, which is accounting money, at virtually
low interest rates, even with negative returns and with an obligation to hold them
until maturity. 
In fact, the BVerfG expresses a strong distrust towards quantitative easing. It
believes that quantitative easing gives some advantages to economically weaker
and less competitive Member States. That is why the objections began with OMT
(Outright Monetary Transactions), which was a program for the “bad guys”. It
was a program only for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus. Also, OMT was never
implemented. It’s a theoretical program, it worked as a threat. The PSPP, as applied
now, does not include Greece. The applicants had also challenged the act on the
eligibility of the Greek bonds of 2016, but in reality they did not make the Greek
bonds eligible. They become eligible now with the Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Program.
14. The main financial argument of the BVerfG is that, although it is not explicitly
stated, it is clear that we do not have a truly secondary market here, we have a
virtual secondary market. Essentially, according to the BVerfG, the market through
PSPP is primary. Countries issue their bonds and their commercial banks buy them
because they know they will in turn sell them to the Eurosystem.
15. It is rather easy to contradict and respond to the financial analyses and
assumptions of the BVerfG, by referring to the internationally prevalent practices of
central banks. The question is how and to whom the answer will be given so as not
to disturb the institutional structure of the EU. What will come next largely depends
on how the Bundesbank will behave within the ECB and the European System of
Central Banks (point 235). In my opinion, a trap has been created: How should
the ECB, the European Commission and the Council react? Will an infringement
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procedure be initiated against Germany? When should this be done and what effects
will it have?
16. On 18 May the joint Franco-German proposal by President Macron and
Chancellor Merkel was presented. It concerns a recovery plan from the economic
crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, worth € 500 million and financed through
the issuance of bonds by the European Union itself in the context of multi-year fiscal
planning. Can it be perceived as a first actual and clear answer to the decision of the
BVerfG?
One reading is that this proposal is a step forward, towards the “common debt” and
the issuance of Eurobonds. Political as well as legal objections are already being
voiced from Member States (Austria and the Netherlands) and in Germany (by
Friedrich Merz, a candidate for CDU leadership and the succession of Chancellor
Angela Merkel). A relevant constitutional appeal to the BVerfG is possible.
The other reading is that with this plan, the economically and fiscally more robust
Member States, which function as net contributors, avoid contributing additional
funds to the EU budget. The EU borrows directly as an entity, the same way as
the EIB and the ESM. There is not even the need for Member States to function
as guarantors, since the existing budget of the EU itself is a guarantee. Therefore,
the joint proposal seems to be a step in the right direction, towards the common
debt and the Eurobond even. However, it is actually a means of avoiding additional
charges and transfers from the Member States that are net contributors to the EU.
Institutional symbolism, nevertheless, may be seen as being more important than
economic substance. We will see relatively soon, how the German Constitutional
Court, which wanted to enter the field of economic policy that belongs primarily to the
democratically legitimate and responsible political leadership, responds to these new
questions.
17. The final control over almost everything in the European Union lies with
the Council and the European Council, because critical issues are dealt with
intergovernmentally and through political negotiation. The European Council cannot
therefore remain on the fence in this issue. The legal actions and the financial
arguments are all well and good, but in the end the project of European integration is
a historic bet which must be made and won by those who lead a Europe that is being
tried and tested in every field possible.
18. The decision of the German Constitutional Court essentially promises a Union
that is financially passive in the context of international economy and economically
unequal within itself. This is a dangerous concept, not only economically, but also
socially, since European societies are insecure, tired and demanding, above all
politically, and the first objective should be to protect European liberal democracy
against the threats of ideological, political and economic nationalism-populism.
On 05 May 2020, a mine has been set in the institutional and monetary foundations
of the EU, and we have to see if it can be defused immediately, so that it stops
lurking there, poisoning the EU’s functioning and prospects.
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